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This paper compares and contrasts interactions between monetary and fiscal pol-
icies in major economies following the recent pandemic recession with selected 
episodes from the past, notably the Great Inflation of the 1970s, the Great Mod-
eration of the 1990s, and the Great Financial Crisis and its aftermath. Interac-
tions between fiscal and monetary policies in these periods were characterised 
respectively by the collapse of consensus about fiscal dominance, strict separation 
of monetary and fiscal policies, and intermittent close coordination. The paper 
tentatively argues that a consensus on the “new normal” for the two policies is 
unlikely to emerge in the near term.
Keywords: fiscal policy, monetary policy, policy coordination, policy interactions, 
fiscal dominance, pandemic recession, macroeconomic stabilisation
1 INTRODUCTION
The two prime macroeconomic powers of the state, monetary and fiscal policies, 
interact closely. Both have a major impact on aggregate demand and, to varying 
degrees, aggregate supply. Fiscal policy affects aggregate demand and supply 
directly through the taxes and incentives they create, by public investment, transfers 
to household and firms, and wages in the public sector. Monetary policy works more 
indirectly, primarily through the interest rate, which influences financing conditions 
and thereby consumption and investment. Its effects on the real sector, notably busi-
ness fixed investment, are generally slower and less certain, but also more pervasive 
– interest rates in particular “get into all the cracks” (Stein, 2013). 
In this paper the focus is on interactions between monetary and fiscal policies as 
macroeconomic stabilisation tools. The analysis is done in very broad strokes. Of 
particular interest are episodes when fiscal and monetary policies freed each 
other’s space for action, and those when they worked at cross-purposes. Prime 
examples of positive interactions are coordinated global monetary and fiscal 
expansion after the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2008-09, and unprec-
edented fiscal and monetary stimulus across major economies in response to pan-
demic-induced lockdowns in 2020. Examples of less helpful interactions can also 
be found in the post-financial crisis period: with interest rates and inflation at all-
time lows, a sustainable fiscal stimulus from 2012 on could have helped lift infla-
tion in the short term and potential output in the long term. But fiscal policy was 
arguably too tight, stunting the recovery and shifting the burden of supporting the 
post-crisis recovery to monetary policy (Bernanke, 2013; Draghi, 2014). 
A longer-term perspective is helpful in describing policy interactions because 
throughout history monetary and fiscal policies have been closely intertwined. To 
the extent that one can identify similarities and differences between policy roles in 
respective historical episodes, one can be in a better position to understand whether 
some issues are missing or are being overstressed in current policy discussions. This 































































421highlights the return of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool during 
the pandemic. It also highlights the lack of consensus about the proper roles of mon-
etary and fiscal policies in the face of some old and new challenges facing the global 
economy in the aftermath of the financial and pandemic crises.
The paper starts with a brief overview of monetary and fiscal policies during the 
Covid pandemic. The second section discusses the longstanding issue of the policy 
mix, illustrating it with the dilemma about the “right” amount of stimulus that many 
monetary and fiscal authorities face at the current juncture. The third section turns to 
two aspects of longer-term interactions: the issues of public debt sustainability and 
the dominance of fiscal over monetary policy. The concluding section provides 
some thoughts on what kind of consensus on the two policies might emerge.
2 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES DURING THE COVID PANDEMIC
As the recession induced by lockdowns in 2020-21 unfolded, monetary and fiscal 
policy worked closely together to cushion the pandemic’s economic fallout. Mon-
etary policy stabilised the financial system, kept credit flowing and eased financ-
ing conditions more generally. Fiscal policy shielded firms and households 
through transfers and loan guarantees. In the process, both policies supported each 
other. Large-scale central bank purchases of sovereign debt eased government 
financing constraints, and fiscal backstops and guarantees leveraged the central 
bank’s lending power. 
The combined stimulus provided by monetary and fiscal authorities was unprec-
edented. Fiscal support reached in aggregate over 9% of world GDP (around 
$10 trillion) as of March 2021. Among advanced economies, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States provided the largest support, 
from 17 to 26% of GDP over 2020-21 (graph 1, left-hand panel). In Europe, the 
fiscal push was smaller, 7-11% of GDP, supplemented from mid-2021 by multi-
year grants from the Next Generation EU Fund. In emerging market economies, 
the support was generally smaller, but nonetheless substantial: Brazil managed to 
provide 12% of GDP in fiscal support; China, Korea and South Africa close to 7%; 
and many others up to 5% (right-hand panel). 
Monetary stimulus was no less forceful. Many central banks cut policy rates to 
all-time lows, often close to or below zero (graph 2, left-hand panel). They also 
deployed unconventional tools – large-scale asset purchases, special lending pro-
grammes, forward guidance, yield curve control – including in many emerging 
market economies (centre panel). As a result, the size of the major central banks’ 
balance sheet is at a historical high in most countries (right-hand panel), largely 
































































Fiscal stimulus during the pandemic (as percentage of GDP) 1
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1 Including health and non-health related spending measures announced through March 2021, 
based on IMF’s Fiscal Policies Database. For the European Recovery and Resilience Facility, 
50% of grants assumed to be spent in 2021.
Sources: European Commission; IMF, Fiscal Policies Database; OECD; author’s calculations.
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Monetary stimulus during the pandemic 
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1 Total assets; median values for eight advanced economies (AEs) and 22 emerging market 
economies (EMEs). EMEA = emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa.
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS, Database on monetary policy announcements during Covid-19; 
Cantu et al. (2021).
The active role of fiscal policy in response to the pandemic shock is noteworthy 
because academic work and policy analysis had advocated against such stabilisation 
function ever since the 1970s’ Great Inflation. This view was reflected in leading 
textbooks: Mankiw and Taylor (2011), for instance, highlighted long and uncertain 
lags in the implementation of tax and spending measures, and the consensus view 
that automatic stabilisers were far more effective for macroeconomic stabilisation 
over the business cycle than discretionary fiscal measures. That said, they acknowl-































































423recessions completely, and argued against a strict balanced budget rule, which could, 
in effect become an “automatic destabiliser” (ibid, 778).
The rebound of the global economy since mid-2020 suggests that the combined 
monetary and fiscal stimulus has been effective so far. However, the unprece-
dented size of the stimulus has raised a number of questions, including about the 
calibration of the policy mix in the short-term, the longer-term consequences of 
stimulus for individual countries and the global economy, and the nature of inter-
actions between fiscal and monetary policies in an elusive “new normal” regime 
that has yet to emerge after the financial crisis.
2.1 SHORT-TERM INTERACTIONS
In the short term, monetary and fiscal policies interact mainly through their respec-
tive stances. The “right” policy mix depends on the stage of the business and 
financial cycle and the structure of the economy. At the current post-pandemic 
recession juncture, the key question is whether monetary and fiscal policies are 
doing “too little” or “too much” to support the recovery, i.e., whether they are 
withdrawing support too early or providing it for too long. Given that monetary 
policy has by and large reached the limits of its expansionary stance, this has 
mainly been a question about the “right” fiscal policy stance. 
2.2 NOT ENOUGH STIMULUS?
The main risk of withdrawing stimulus too early is that the recovery will falter. 
The pandemic is far from over, and growth is still fragile and very uneven across 
sectors, regions, and countries. Recent output gap projections point to sizable 
slack until 2023 in most countries, especially where fiscal stimulus was modest 
(IMF, 2021a). Withdrawing fiscal stimulus too early would put pressure on mon-
etary policy to close output gaps. That would probably delay the recovery because 
monetary policy alone is not as powerful as when it works together with fiscal 
policy. With interest rates already at the effective lower bound, monetary policy 
would have to rely on unconventional tools, which tend to become less effective 
over time.1 The double-dip recession after the Great Financial Crisis, when fiscal 
policy in the United States turned too restrictive because of domestic political ten-
sions, and in Europe because of the sovereign debt crisis, are recent examples. 
Another risk of early withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and prolonged reliance on 
monetary policy could be excessive risk taking in the financial sector. This risk 
arose for instance during the Great Financial Crisis. Forward guidance, yield 
curve control and, to some extent, large-scale asset purchases typically induce 
investors to search for yield, which tends to heighten financial market volatility. 
1 Early rounds of central bank purchases of a given asset class seem to be more effective in reducing long-
term yields than subsequent rounds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013). Other studies find, how-
ever, that the sheer announcement of asset purchases works to reduce the eligible assets’ credit spreads by up 
to four times as much as the actual purchases (Gilchrist et al., 2020). This suggests that, if credible, central 































































424 Market participants also become highly sensitive to threshold effects of policy 
revisions, such as perceived interest rate “lift-off”. A case in point is the “taper 
tantrum” episode in mid-2013, when US Treasury yields increased sharply after 
the Federal Reserve announced that, at some future date, it would reduce the vol-
ume of bond purchases under its quantitative easing programme.
In addition, asset valuations can become overstretched with prolonged monetary 
stimulus. For instance, equity prices increased sharply in most advanced economies 
during 2020-21 despite the fragile and uneven recovery. House prices were rising 
fast as well, partly due to demand factors (shift to work from home), partly due to 
lower interest rates and fiscal support, which helped households maintain their debt 
servicing capacity. These developments could lead to sharp corrections in equity 
and house prices if fiscal stimulus is withdrawn too early and monetary policy 
becomes “the only game in town”, as was the case in 2012-13 (Rajan, 2013).
Withdrawing fiscal stimulus too early could also harm the prospects for raising 
potential growth. Public investment in education, transportation infrastructure, 
energy and telecommunications, digital and green technologies could catalyse pri-
vate investment in these areas and help boost productivity growth over the medium 
term. Recent estimates suggest that well-targeted public investment of 1% of GDP 
can raise output over four years by 0.5 percentage points in emerging market 
economies, and 1.2 points in advanced economies (IMF, 2020). If productivity 
growth is sustained over a longer period, public investment could help raise the 
natural interest rate, r*, as well, thereby creating room for monetary policy 
manoeuvre. Productivity-enhancing investments are also needed because pro-
longed lockdowns could lead to labour skill losses (“hysteresis effects”), which 
could be larger than in “normal” recessions in the sectors hit particularly hard by 
the pandemic. This could increase the risk of staying trapped in the regime of low 
potential growth, which characterised most of the post-GFC decade.
2.3 TOO MUCH STIMULUS?
The main risk of providing “too much” stimulus is that the economy overheats 
and inflation becomes hard to control. This was the case in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when many advanced economies experienced stagflation – stagnating growth with 
rising unemployment and inflation. One inflationary impulse at the time came 
from the 1973 oil price shock. Two others, more persistent, came from expansion-
ary public spending and high wage demands of trade unions. Highly regulated 
economies and pervasive financial repression aggravated the situation and com-
plicated policy choices. To cushion the rise in unemployment and the fall in real 
income, fiscal and monetary policies turned expansionary. Budget deficits, public 
debt and money supply increased rapidly, and real interest rates fell or turned 
negative for much of the 1970s. Many governments found it increasingly difficult 
to finance growing budget and balance of payments deficits. The UK government, 
for instance, approached the IMF in September 1976 for a loan of $3.9 billion, the 































































425Stagflation ended only after central banks regained credibility by tightening mone-
tary policy and bringing down inflation, and after fiscal authorities started the long, 
arduous process of fiscal consolidation. The latter included changes in the tax sys-
tem (including expansion of the value-added tax and reduction of harmful progres-
sivity of the income tax); privatisation of loss-making public enterprises (to reduce 
expenditure); and deregulation of the economy and domestic financial liberalisation 
(to raise potential growth and wind down financial repression). Countries such as 
Germany and Switzerland, which maintained prudent fiscal policies and swiftly 
adopted a new nominal anchor – monetary targeting – after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods largely succeeded in escaping the great inflation. Their success partly paved 
the way for emphasis on stable public finances along with central bank independ-
ence and the anchoring of inflation expectations under inflation targeting.
Currently, the prospect of such 1970s-style stagflation seems remote. The recent rise 
in inflation seems to reflect for the most part one-off factors – base effects, indirect 
tax changes, increases in commodity and food prices, constrained supply and logis-
tics (IMF, 2021b). With the exception of China and the United States, output gaps in 
major economies are not projected to be closed in the next two years. Recent empir-
ical evidence based on historical data also suggests that even large fiscal expansions 
generate only modest inflation (Hazell et al., 2021). Importantly, fiscal expansion 
and upward revisions of growth forecasts in advanced economies have not lifted 
market participants’ expectations of inflation over the medium term.
Nevertheless, pent-up demand from excess saving during lockdowns and fiscal 
stimulus could lead to overheating in some cases. One reason is that fiscal multi-
pliers tend to be much larger when policy rates are at effective lower bound (Klein 
and Winkler, 2021; Amendola et al., 2019). Fiscal policy thus has to intervene 
more aggressively to compensate for less potent monetary policy, leading to 
higher and more volatile public debt (Hofmann et al., 2021). This effect is not 
limited to advanced economies. In Chile and Peru, for instance, authorities allowed 
the withdrawal of household savings accumulated in defined-contribution pension 
funds. Consistent with the notion that poorer households tend to have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume and that transfers to such households deliver 
higher spending multipliers, this has led to somewhat higher inflation than in 
countries where a proportionately greater share of fiscal support went to firms.2 
In emerging market economies, an additional consideration is the threat of 
exchange rate depreciation and capital outflows. If inflation pressures persist, 
monetary easing could lead to further capital outflows (Banerjee et al., 2020). 
Central banks may thus be forced to raise interest rates. However, this may make 
domestic debt even less attractive to foreign investors and lead to further currency 
depreciation, given that higher domestic interest rates aggravate debt sustainabil-
ity problems (Blanchard, 2004). 
2 Recent estimates, for instance, suggest that financially constrained recipients of one-off transfers (such as 
paychecks) spend 62% of the payment within two weeks, against 35% for unconstrained recipients (Karg-































































426 3 LONG-TERM INTERACTIONS 
In the longer term, interactions between monetary and fiscal policies face further 
challenges, notably from high public debt and threats to central bank independ-
ence, i.e., the risk of return to some form of fiscal dominance. 
3.1 WILL PUBLIC DEBT REMAIN SUSTAINABLE?
The current juncture partly reflects deeper trends that the pandemic has exacer-
bated. Fiscal expansion in many countries took place from an already historically 
high level of public debt: overall fiscal deficits reached 12% of GDP on average in 
advanced economies and 10% in emerging market economies in 2020 (table 1). 
Global public debt stock climbed above 100% of GDP, more than 10 percentage 
points higher than before the pandemic. The increase was facilitated by central 
banks, which lowered policy rates and purchased government bonds in pursuit of 
their mandates, and, in some countries, larger public debt holdings by the domes-
tic banking system. 
Table 1
Government balance and public debt (as a percentage of GDP)
General government balance Gross public debt
2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021
Euro area -0.6 -7.6 -6.7 84 97 98
 France -3.0 -9.9 -7.2 98 114 115
 Germany 1.5 -4.2 -5.5 60 69 70
 Spain -2.9 -11.5 -9.0 96 117 118
 Italy -1.6 -9.5 -8.8 135 156 157
Japan -3.1 -12.6 -9.4 235 256 257
United Kingdom -2.3 -13.4 -11.8 85 104 107
United States -5.7 -15.8 -15.0 108 127 133
Brazil -5.9 -13.4 -8.3 88 99 98
China -6.3 -11.4 -9.6 57 67 70
India -7.4 -12.3 -10.0 74 90 87
South Korea 0.4 -3.1 -2.7 42 48 53
Mexico -2.3 -4.6 -3.4 53 61 61
Russia 1.9 -4.1 -0.8 14 19 18
Turkey -6.4 -7.4 -7.1 32 40 40
South Africa -5.3 -12.2 -10.6 62 77 81
Source: IMF (2021c).
At the same time, nominal interest rates have never been so low, and in real terms 
they have been negative for even longer than during the Great Inflation (BIS, 
2021). Despite record-high debt-to-GDP ratios, service costs are thus at post-war 
lows and the debt burden seems very light. This does not mean that debt sustain-
ability issues are unimportant. Fiscal sustainability depends on the joint dynamics 
of the recovery and financing conditions for governments. If the recent optimistic 
growth expectations materialise, growth in GDP could replenish the tax base, 































































427interest rates, which predated the pandemic recession, also helps generate a sus-
tainable debt trajectory. Other secular trends – including slower population growth 
and longer duration of retirement, which strengthen the propensity to save – also 
suggest that real interest rates may remain low in the medium term (Furman and 
Summers, 2020). If so, government debt rollover may not call for outsized future 
tax increases or spending consolidation.
Favourable refinancing conditions cannot be taken for granted, however. In the longer 
term, the aging of the population will likely increase public debt burden through 
higher primary deficits, especially in countries with pay-as-you-go pension schemes. 
Larger debt exposes the economy to multiple equilibria because differentials between 
real interest rates (r) and real growth rates (g) are sensitive to the initial government 
debt level (Cochrane, 2021). Countries with higher initial public debt thus tend to 
experience a shorter duration of negative (r – g) episodes, and larger increases in inter-
est rates in response to greater financial market volatility. For instance, a 1 percentage 
point increase in debt/GDP in emerging market economies is associated with an 
almost 0.4 percentage points increase in (r – g) when the legacy public debt exceeds 
70% of GDP (Lian, Presbitero and Wiriadinata, 2020). These non-linearities may be 
explained by the self-reinforcing mechanism between risk premia and debt levels, 
which can lead to significantly different debt paths (i.e., multiple equilibria) even if the 
initial conditions change only marginally. Market sentiment can change particularly 
abruptly for countries that depend on external financing.
3.2 THREAT OF FISCAL DOMINANCE?
The second longer-term challenge for monetary-fiscal interactions is the risk of 
fiscal dominance. In broadest terms, fiscal dominance denotes a situation in which 
monetary policy is subordinated to fiscal policy objectives. This was the case, for 
instance, in advanced economies from the Great Depression in the mid-1930 until 
the collapse of the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. 
In this period, central banks routinely engaged in financial repression to allow 
governments to issue debt at low interest rates, and often directed cheap credit to 
targeted industries or firms so as to fulfil their own economic objectives. These 
practices included capping interest rates, imposing high reserve requirements on 
banks, requiring banks to hold government debt via capital requirements, regulat-
ing competition in the banking sector, restricting international capital movements, 
and other measures that kept nominal interest rates typically below the rate of 
inflation. To the extent that interest rates were adjusted for other objectives, this 
was mainly at times of balance of payments pressures. 
Interestingly, financial repression is also associated with the “golden age” of European 
growth from 1950 to 1973. In this period, authorities in countries such as France and 
Italy established a range of public and mixed ownership institutions specialised in 
credit allocation to targeted industries (Monnet, 2012). Economic growth and finan-
cial repression thus went hand in hand for a quarter century, without negative conse-































































428 Since the liberalisation of financial markets in the 1980s and widespread achieve-
ment of central bank independence in the 1990s, fiscal dominance has come to 
denote a situation in which monetary policy cannot be tightened because of the 
interest rate sensitivity of debt service costs. Strong institutional safeguards 
designed to shield the central bank’s operational autonomy can be effective when 
pressures are purely of a political nature. But they can do relatively little when the 
constraint is economic. For instance, in emerging market economies higher inter-
est rates to counter inflation may undermine the government’s creditworthiness, 
especially where debt is at floating rates. This can trigger a disruptive capital out-
flow, a sharp currency depreciation, and even higher inflation. 
Fiscal constraints can also tie the central bank’s hands in advanced economies. 
One example is the sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2011-12, when the loss of 
market access for some governments disrupted the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in the euro area and gave rise to currency denomination risk. 
Another is the sovereign-bank nexus: in a fiscal crisis, banks holding large 
amounts of government bonds are exposed to distress or outright crisis. Banking 
crises in turn lead to large fiscal costs and big increases in sovereign debt, typi-
cally in the order of 20-25% of GDP over a five-year window (Laeven and Valen-
cia, 2018). Fragilities in the non-financial corporate sector can further aggravate 
matters if domestic banks are heavily exposed to it. 
To what extent could large-scale central bank purchases of government debt, con-
ducted as part of quantitative easing operations, heighten the risk of fiscal domi-
nance? How far could such measures blur the boundaries between monetary and 
fiscal policies? 
From the perspective of the consolidated public sector balance sheet, government 
bond purchases under quantitative easing programmes are equivalent to large debt 
management operations: the public sector retires long-term government debt from 
the secondary bond market and replaces it with overnight debt, i.e., interest-bear-
ing central bank reserves (Blommestein and Turner, 2012). The distinguishing 
element of monetary financing is the explicit link to fiscal deficits and governance 
arrangements whereby the finance ministry decides the size, time and duration of 
central bank bond purchases. That link is missing in the case of quantitative eas-
ing. Central banks have undertaken bond purchases in the context of a surge in 
government borrowing needs, with a view to keeping sovereign bond markets 
liquid and functional, and supporting the smooth financing of emergency fiscal 
spending. Such operations are fully in line with central banks’ primary objectives 
of safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability (Bailey, 2020). Impor-
tantly, central banks have retained full control over such operations and can 
unwind them as economic circumstances require. 
A related question that has attracted considerable attention in academic literature 































































429According to monetarists, monetising a deficit results in a higher rate of inflation 
than bond financing. However, Sargent and Wallace (1981) derived conditions 
under which bond financing could lead to higher long-run inflation. Under such 
“unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”, tightening current monetary conditions requires 
higher growth of interest-bearing debt. Because the government must eventually 
pay primary deficits and the increase in debt and accumulated interest, the central 
bank has to raise the money supply at some point. This results in higher inflation 
than if the central bank had not resorted to tightening in the first place. A valuable 
insight of this analysis is that fiscal dominance is generally higher where the cred-
itworthiness of the sovereign is weaker, not stronger. 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
How is the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies likely to evolve after 
the pandemic? Will the complementarity forged during the anti-recession effort in 
2020-21 endure? Or will the two policies separate again, as they did during the 
Great Moderation? 
In the years ahead, regaining room for manoeuvre will be important for both poli-
cies. The above analysis suggests that for some central banks the relationship with 
fiscal policies may have become “too close for comfort” (Weidmann, 2020). One 
scenario is thus a return to some form of separation between the two policies. Fis-
cal authorities will need to ensure public debt sustainability, and central banks will 
need to continue fulfilling their stability mandates. This implies that the two poli-
cies could at times work at cross-purposes, with fiscal consolidation putting pres-
sure on monetary policy to remain easy, and monetary policy normalisation put-
ting pressure on government borrowing costs. 
Uncertainty about the respective roles of monetary and fiscal policies is thus likely 
to stay with us for some time. As noted above, interactions between them have 
typically swung from periods of consensus to those of uncertainty about the rela-
tionship. Goodhart (2016) identified two periods of consensus since the Second 
World War: about fiscal dominance (through the early 1970s); and about the sepa-
ration of two policies, i.e., independent central banks and inflation targeting on the 
one hand, and prudent fiscal policy, possibly supported by fiscal rules, on the other 
(mid-1980s to 2007). There were also two periods in which central banks searched 
for consensus: stagflation in the 1970s; and financial instability, slow growth and 
low inflation after the Great Financial Crisis. Innovations in central bank policies 
introduced after the crisis – balance sheet policies and macroprudential measures 
– have strengthened the monetary policy toolkit and are likely to remain part of it 
in the future. But as discussed above, they also carry some risks for central banks’ 
decision-making autonomy. 
The disruptions caused by the Covid pandemic have added a new element of 
uncertainty to this relationship, notably the recent rise in inflation. Although this 































































430 normalisation. In addition, new challenges have been added to policy agendas: 
addressing the rise in inequality and climate related risks, among others. The 
expectations about what central banks in particular can do are thus not likely to 
diminish (Bartscher et al., 2021). This might create additional strains for the rela-
tionship between monetary and fiscal policies, as they cannot deliver on these 
expectations without the help of structural economic policies. 
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